The Draft EU Quantum Act Reported on 10 November 2026 Follows Kop's Two-Pillar Blueprint From the Columbia Journal of European Law and the Kop–Forrest Futurium Brief

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A Commission power to set binding post-quantum migration milestones, a Chips Act-style industrial pillar, supply-chain monitoring and post-quantum purchasing conditions: the leaked draft brings together proposals I published first, in 2025 and 2026. Its ownership-based supplier rule is the one part that needs separate scrutiny.

Quantum Governance

A Commission power to set binding post-quantum migration milestones, a Chips Act-style industrial pillar, supply-chain monitoring and post-quantum purchasing conditions: the leaked draft brings together proposals I published first, in 2025 and 2026. Its ownership-based supplier rule is the one part that needs separate scrutiny.

Published by Quentir Systems LLC · November 18, 2026 · 8 min read

The European Union has two established legislative models for a technology it wants both to regulate and to build. In July 2008 the Union adopted the New Legislative Framework, Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 and Decision No 768/2008/EC, the toolbox of essential requirements, harmonized standards, conformity assessment and CE marking that EU harmonized product legislation draws on. In September 2023 it adopted the European Chips Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/1781, which funds pilot lines, supports first-of-a-kind production facilities and monitors the semiconductor supply chain. My 2025 Columbia article set out a two-pillar architecture for a European Quantum Act that joins those two traditions, combining regulation with industrial and security policy. The leaked draft of the Act, reported in November 2026, moves along that design in its industrial, security and purchasing provisions.

Practical takeaway. The draft EU Quantum Act reported on 10 November 2026 is unofficial, and the Commission has not yet published a proposal. As reported, it would bind public buyers in critical sectors to post-quantum readiness, set 2030 industrial targets and give the Commission a supply-chain monitoring role. Its supplier rule limits strategic projects and quantum procurement to EU-controlled companies, with a reciprocity route for partner countries.

What I proposed in the Columbia Journal of European Law in 2025 and in the Futurium brief of 17 September 2025

In Towards a European Quantum Act: A Two-Pillar Framework for Regulation and Innovation (Columbia Journal of European Law 31-1, 2025; also on arXiv), I proposed that the Act rest on two pillars. The first is regulation in the style of the New Legislative Framework: risk-based requirements, harmonized standards and conformity assessment for quantum products and services. The second is industrial and security policy modeled on the Chips Act: investment in pilot lines and production capacity, security of supply, and tools to watch over dependencies. The article included a model provision on quantum cybersecurity and Q-Day preparedness, calling for "a strategic plan for migrating the EU's critical digital and cryptographic infrastructure to quantum-safe standards" with clear timelines and a "legally-binding migration to post-quantum-cryptography (PQC) strategy." On supply chains it proposed monitoring dependencies through a Quantum Criticality Index, together with investment screening and review of outbound investment.

The policy brief I coauthored with Tracey Forrest, A Strategic Framework for the European Quantum Act: A Standards-First Approach to Secure a Democratic and Competitive Future, appeared on the Commission's Futurium platform on 17 September 2025. It translated the framework into recommendations for European policymakers and placed standards at the front: European standards bodies aligning with their U.S. counterparts, particularly NIST, because "the strategic goal is to create a unified, trusted transatlantic market." The blueprint seeks European technological sovereignty and Europe's own industrial capacity, pursued through investment, standards and partnership with like-minded countries.

Three proposals in the draft reported on 10 November 2026: Union-wide PQC migration, a Chips Act-style industrial pillar and supply-chain monitoring

The leaked draft EU Quantum Act moves along the architecture I set out in the Columbia article, with its recommendations published on Futurium. According to The Quantum Insider's report of 10 November 2026, based on a draft the publication obtained, three of the blueprint's core proposals now appear in the text.

The first is a Union-wide post-quantum migration. Member states would report on their preparedness within six months of entry into force and annually after that, and the Commission could set binding migration milestones. The second is the industrial pillar in the Chips Act style, which the draft fills with concrete targets: about 100 error-corrected logical qubits per system by 2030 or soon after, interoperable metropolitan quantum networks by 2030, and the EuroQCI communication infrastructure on the ground and in space by 2031. The third is Commission monitoring of supply dependencies, including a list of critical quantum components and attention to risks from foreign acquisitions. The Commission's quantum policy page lists research and innovation, industrial capacity, and supply-chain resilience and governance as the Act's objectives, the same three areas the blueprint covers.

Quentir's earlier post on the draft is a chronology from the April 2024 Commission Recommendation to the November 2026 text, and it sets out the clause-level detail and the questions under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. This post compares the draft's provisions with the proposals I published earlier.

How the draft makes post-quantum readiness a condition of public purchasing, and where that mechanism was first proposed

As reported, the draft requires infrastructure, equipment and systems bought in designated critical sectors to be post-quantum ready and crypto-agile in procurement procedures that start six months after entry into force. Where no suitable product exists yet, the purchase would need crypto-agility and a documented migration plan, and limited exceptions would require a technical and security assessment, compensating protections and upgrade deadlines. Buyers would also weigh security of supply, interoperability and support over a product's operating life. Where a strategic partnership allows reciprocal participation, the Commission could authorize access for firms from partner countries, subject to safeguards on security, intellectual property and European technological interests. The six-month period, the exception regime and the reporting cycle are the draft's own drafting.

The draft's requirement is post-quantum readiness and crypto-agility; the report does not describe a validation requirement. Making cryptography a condition of public purchase is the mechanism I proposed first. In A Bletchley Park for the Quantum Age (War on the Rocks, November 6, 2025), I proposed "conditioning all federal purchases on validated cryptography," "machine-readable cryptography bills of materials," annual crypto-agility drills, mutual recognition between NIST's validation program and the EU's Common Criteria scheme, and a certification club offering access to allied procurement and markets for those who certify, with "reciprocity with trusted suppliers." The Nexus paper developed reciprocity-based exceptions for trusted partners and periodic reassessment of restrictions, and Before Q-Day, written with Joe Federici (War on the Rocks, July 20, 2026), added cryptographic bills of materials and vendor migration road maps as procurement documents. Security of supply, from the Columbia article, and certified interoperability, from the Bletchley Park piece, now appear among the draft's buyer criteria. The reported draft brings these proposals into the same legislative framework.

The one element I have not proposed is the ownership test. The draft would generally limit strategic projects and public procurement of quantum products, systems and services to EU-controlled companies. Building on the allied-access arrangements I developed and on the LSI test from the 2026 Nexus paper, I consider that this eligibility rule warrants separate scrutiny. In legal terms, the LSI test is a proportionality test with a built-in subsidiarity check that places legal friction at the layer of the quantum stack where it can affect the targeted capability. Restrictions should address demonstrable security risks through the least trade-restrictive, security-sufficient and innovation-preserving means available. Access for allied partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and South Korea should follow published, certification-based criteria with periodic review. Ownership alone should not exclude a supplier where a narrower security measure would suffice. Published criteria keep the market open to new entrants.

Why European quantum firms need growth capital, first customers, production capacity and access to allied markets

Europe's experience with AI exposes a problem of scale. Europe has no homegrown cloud platform with the global reach and financial capacity of the leading U.S. hyperscalers, and the Commission's June 2026 communication on European tech sovereignty, COM(2026) 503, describes "high market concentration and vendor lock-in by a few non-EU players across the technology stack." In quantum, Europe has an emerging ecosystem of startups and scale-ups, supported by strong research institutions and specialist suppliers, and the Commission's Quantum Europe Strategy of July 2025 sets out to turn research strength into industrial capacity.

Turning that base into a durable industry requires growth capital, production capacity and customers willing to buy and deploy European technologies. Public procurement can give firms a commercial track record, and access to allied markets can support their expansion beyond the Union. Eligibility rules should therefore be assessed for their effects on security, competition and the ability of European firms to scale, since a supplier rule that narrows the customer base also narrows the revenue from which a scale-up finances its next production line.

Who has cited the Columbia blueprint since September 2025: Crismani, Neuwirth, and Schmidt, Seskir and Vermaas

Within about a year the Columbia article was cited in independent scholarship across eight countries, from Russia to Turkey and Switzerland. The literature on a European Quantum Act that followed cites, discusses and builds on the blueprint, the first of its kind. Andrea Crismani's study of quantum technology law in CERIDAP (2/2026), Rostam J. Neuwirth's article "A Future European Union 'Quantum Act'?" in the Macau Journal of Global Legal Studies (2025), and the position paper by Adrian Schmidt, Zeki C. Seskir and Pieter Vermaas of KIT and TU Delft on the EU Quantum Act (arXiv 2607.22049) all engage with it.

How Quentir Reads It

The Commission has not yet published its proposal, and the text may change before it does. As reported, the draft contains an industrial pillar with 2030 targets, a Commission power to set binding post-quantum migration milestones, dependency monitoring, and a purchasing clause that makes post-quantum readiness and crypto-agility conditions of purchase, with reciprocity for partner countries. The report does not describe the conformity-assessment and standards provisions of the regulatory pillar, and the published proposal will show how far the Commission takes them. The open question for the legislative process is the EU-controlled supplier rule, which affects which firms can sell to European public buyers and on what terms allied suppliers can compete.

For public and private buyers in critical sectors, the purchasing clause would move post-quantum readiness from planning documents into tender requirements. Quentir's Signature Report, the PQC Migration Roadmap, gives organizations the fixed-scope migration sequence, executive summary, checklist and refresh triggers that this post does not reproduce.

Sources: Mauritz Kop, "Towards a European Quantum Act: A Two-Pillar Framework for Regulation and Innovation", Columbia Journal of European Law 31(1) (2025), SSRN 5480630, arXiv 2509.14262; Mauritz Kop and Tracey Forrest, "A Strategic Framework for the European Quantum Act: A Standards-First Approach to Secure a Democratic and Competitive Future", Futurium (European AI Alliance), 17 September 2025; The Quantum Insider, Matt Swayne, "Draft EU Quantum Act Would Favor European Suppliers, Set Computing and Security Targets", 10 November 2026 (report on an unofficial draft obtained by the publication; the draft itself is not public); Mauritz Kop, "A Bletchley Park for the Quantum Age", War on the Rocks, 6 November 2025; Mauritz Kop, "The Nexus of Quantum Technology, Intellectual Property, and National Security: An LSI Test for Securing the Quantum Industrial Commons", arXiv 2602.15051 (2026), pp. 62-64; Mauritz Kop and Joe Federici, "Before Q-Day: The Race to Quantum First", War on the Rocks, 20 July 2026; European Commission, Quantum Europe Strategy, COM(2025) 363, 2 July 2025, and quantum policy page; European Commission, European Tech Sovereignty, accompanied by an EU Open Source Strategy, COM(2026) 503, 3 June 2026; Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 and Decision No 768/2008/EC (New Legislative Framework, 9 July 2008); Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 (European Chips Act, 13 September 2023); Andrea Crismani, "Diritto delle tecnologie Quantum. Sfide regolatorie", CERIDAP 2026(2); Rostam J. Neuwirth, "A Future European Union 'Quantum Act'? Critical Lessons from the Global AI Governance Debate", Macau Journal of Global Legal Studies 2 (2025) 73-128; Adrian Schmidt, Zeki C. Seskir and Pieter Vermaas, "ELSA as an asset to the EU Quantum Act: A position paper", arXiv 2607.22049 (2026). Links checked 18 November 2026.

Published intelligence, built to inform your own decisions. Published: November 18, 2026.

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