Post-Quantum Transition Henry Quentir Post-Quantum Transition Henry Quentir

What the Bank of England, PRA and FCA Ask of UK Financial Firms on Quantum Computing: The Non-Binding Effective Practices of 19 November 2026 and Consultation CP17/26

What the PRA, FCA and Bank of England published on 19 November 2026

The Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England issued a joint document, "Effective practices: Cyber risk and resilience management relating to quantum computing", on the same day they opened consultation CP17/26 on a new supervisory statement and Final Guidance for cyber risk and resilience. The quantum text describes what boards, senior managers and technology teams can do to prepare for post-quantum cryptography: agree a documented migration plan with milestones and dates, assign responsibility to individuals with authority and skills, and report progress to the board.

What the document asks firms to examine

Firms are pointed to a cryptographic inventory covering applications, databases, APIs, certificates, PKI, authentication, backups, networks and operational technology, and to the data an attacker could harvest today and decrypt later. Hybrid schemes are an interim measure on the way to a PQC-only end state, in line with NCSC guidance. Testing should confirm that systems do not quietly revert to vulnerable algorithms, and the firm stays accountable when a supplier runs the cryptography.

The regulators state that the practices are not part of their formal expectations. This post reads what the text asks for, what it leaves to the NCSC timetable of 2031 and 2035, and how it compares with IOSCO's November report and earlier US and EU supervisory statements.

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Post-Quantum Transition Henry Quentir Post-Quantum Transition Henry Quentir

What the UK-Singapore Financial Dialogue Joint Statement of 20 October 2026 Says About Post-Quantum Cryptography, QKD and Bank Supervisors

What HM Treasury and MAS published after the 20 October 2026 dialogue

On 20 October 2026 the United Kingdom and Singapore held their 11th Financial Dialogue in Singapore, with officials from HM Treasury and the Monetary Authority of Singapore joined by the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority. The joint statement HM Treasury published the same day runs to roughly a thousand words across digital finance, capital markets, sustainable finance and the two countries' 2027 roles at the G20 and in ASEAN. Quantum technology takes one sentence. It says the exchange covered each side's approach to quantum security and to supervisory expectations for financial institutions moving to quantum-safe technology, including the NCSC's post-quantum cryptography migration guidance and lessons from MAS's quantum key distribution sandbox.

Why the two references in that sentence point in different directions

Some trade coverage described the meeting as an agreement on joint oversight and unified standards. The statement contains no such commitment. Its interest lies in the pairing. The NCSC sets 2028, 2031 and 2035 as its migration milestones and says it will not support quantum key distribution for government or military use. MAS has tested QKD with four banks and reported both its potential and its limits. This post reads the sentence closely and asks what a bank supervised in both London and Singapore can take from it.

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Post-Quantum Transition Henry Quentir Post-Quantum Transition Henry Quentir

FINMA Writes Mid-2027 Into the Quantum-Safe Finance Calendar

A supervisory date appears

FINMA Guidance 05/2026 recommends that supervised Swiss financial institutions draw up a post-quantum cryptography roadmap by mid-2027. The guidance follows a survey of 60 banks, insurers, asset managers and financial-market infrastructures conducted between November 2025 and January 2026. Only 8 percent reported having a specific roadmap, while 72 percent said they had not planned or implemented measures. The date gives quantum-safe finance a concrete planning horizon without pretending that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer already exists.

The roadmap reaches beyond cryptography teams

FINMA connects the transition to board-approved strategy, institution-specific risk analysis and a continuously updated cryptographic inventory. That inventory reaches encryption in transit and at rest, digital signatures, key management and authentication across internal systems, outsourced functions and services. Long-lived data receives priority because information stolen today may remain sensitive when stronger quantum machines arrive. Hybrid cryptography may help during migration, although the regulator also notes its added implementation complexity.

Outsourcing terms enter the calendar

The guidance makes crypto-agility in outsourcing a commercial issue. FINMA recommends it as a requirement for new software and data arrangements and asks institutions to incorporate it into existing requirements at the earliest opportunity. Responsibility for an outsourced function remains with the supervised institution. The mid-2027 date therefore measures more than the existence of a document: it exposes whether architecture, supplier dependencies and accountability have entered one credible timetable.

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