Quentir Quarterly, Q4 2026: NATO, Genesis Q, The Hague and DOE Put Quantum on a Calendar
Four moves put quantum on a calendar this autumn. On 17 September, the Department of Energy announced Genesis Q, a competition of up to $215 million in planned funding, with a $100 million base incentive pool in Phase II for a fault-tolerant machine with at least 100 logical qubits; applications close 19 October. On 25 September, a DOE advisory report proposed 50 to more than 100 logical qubits as targets for 2028. On 29 September, NATO published its Quantum Technology Roadmap, with a Quantum Zero Beacon pilot between Brussels and Mons by the fourth quarter of 2027. And on 5 October, the Dutch government set post-quantum deadlines for its own organizations, running from 2026 to 2035. Below, in three lines each: who it concerns, what was announced, and why it matters.
This is the autumn 2026 issue of Quentir Quarterly, sent to subscribers on 6 October and published here in full. It reads each of the four moves in three lines: who it concerns, what was announced, and why it matters. A short section then reads them together, followed by four recent analyses from the blog and a short tour of what is new on quentir.ai, from Signature Report NO. 4 to the Evidence Registers.
Dutch Quantum Strategy of 5 October 2026: Post-Quantum Deadlines From 2026 to 2035, No QKD, and Police Access to a Code-Breaking Quantum Computer
What the Dutch cabinet sent to parliament on 5 October 2026
Minister Heleen Herbert (Economic Affairs and Climate) and State Secretary Willemijn Aerdts (Digital Economy and Sovereignty) sent the Rijksbrede Quantumstrategie, a government-wide quantum strategy prepared with eight other ministries, to the Tweede Kamer. Its 2035 goals are technological leadership, avoiding dependence on quantum applications from outside the EU, and resilience against security threats. The strategy builds on the 614.9 million euros already granted to Quantum Delta NL and comes with no new budget: actions must fit existing departmental means, and ambitions will be adjusted if the money is not found.
The post-quantum timetable for central government
The security chapter sets a post-quantum cryptography schedule for every central government organization. By the end of 2026, quantum risk sits in risk management and each organization has its own cryptography policy. By the end of 2027, draft migration plans, pilots and budgets follow. By the end of 2028, procurement contracts can demand quantum-safe cryptography. High-risk uses must be migrated by the end of 2030 and medium-risk uses by the end of 2035. The strategy places a possible cryptographically relevant quantum computer between 2029 and 2035 and says the date is uncertain.
Two positions that set the Netherlands apart
Central government does not currently use quantum key distribution for information security, citing objections from several European security agencies. And a separate use case describes quantum decryption of criminal and terrorist communications as an opportunity for police, forensic institutes and intelligence services, which the strategy says should gain access to a quantum computer relatively quickly.