GAO's 2024-2025 Post-Quantum Audit of 24 Federal Agencies, Released 6 October 2026, Finds None Met All Inventory, Funding and Testing Practices Ahead of OMB's 22 October Migration Plans
What GAO-27-108740 found at 24 federal agencies in 2024 and 2025
On 6 October 2026 the U.S. Government Accountability Office released the public version of its audit, conducted from February 2024 to September 2025, of how the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies are preparing to move vulnerable systems to post-quantum cryptography. GAO measured three practices drawn from OMB's November 2022 memo M-23-02: a prioritized inventory of systems with vulnerable cryptography, the funding needed to migrate them, and testing in agency environments. None of the 24 agencies fully addressed all three. One agency had a complete inventory of priority systems, 19 used no automated discovery tools, and no agency had tested post-quantum algorithms in its own environment. Agencies may have moved since; the public report does not say.
Why the $7.1 billion figure needs a second look
OMB gave Congress an estimate of about $7.1 billion to migrate priority federal systems or replace legacy systems that cannot support the new algorithms. GAO reports that 21 agencies acknowledged their funding assessments were not fully accurate and that only one assessment rested on a complete inventory.
Why the timing matters in October 2026
The audit work ended in September 2025, and the public version does not discuss OMB's June 2026 memo M-26-15, whose agency migration plans fall due on 22 October 2026. Unless agencies have closed the gaps since 2025, those plans will rest on inventories GAO found incomplete.
Why Germany's BSI Advises Against Classic McEliece for New Systems, Four Months After ISO Standardized It
What BSI changed in its TR-02102 guidance in October 2026
Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) now advises against using Classic McEliece for new developments and when planning new cryptographic applications. The change appears on the agency's page for Technical Guideline TR-02102 and was reported by heise on 6 October 2026. BSI states that the 2026 results do not amount to a practical attack on the parameter sets it had recommended; heise adds that correctly built hybrid deployments keep the protection of their classical component. For new post-quantum cryptography projects, BSI points to FrodoKEM, ML-KEM and HQC.
Why two preprints from August and September 2026 moved a national guideline
In August, Ghoshal, Ishai, Jain and Sun posted a quasipolynomial-time method that tells Classic McEliece public keys apart from random ones, covering every parameter set reviewed in the NIST process. In September, Stephen A. Weis of Anthropic cut the cost of the attack's core linear-algebra step to between 2^89 and 2^98 bit operations and described two key-recovery methods. Neither paper breaks a deployed key.
Why a standard and a guideline can now point in different directions
ISO published Classic McEliece in June 2026 in amendment 2 to ISO/IEC 18033-2, the same amendment that standardizes FrodoKEM. A national guideline chooses among standardized options, so a procurement clause that only asks for an ISO-standardized algorithm no longer settles which scheme a supplier may ship.
Dutch Quantum Strategy of 5 October 2026: Post-Quantum Deadlines From 2026 to 2035, No QKD, and Police Access to a Code-Breaking Quantum Computer
What the Dutch cabinet sent to parliament on 5 October 2026
Minister Heleen Herbert (Economic Affairs and Climate) and State Secretary Willemijn Aerdts (Digital Economy and Sovereignty) sent the Rijksbrede Quantumstrategie, a government-wide quantum strategy prepared with eight other ministries, to the Tweede Kamer. Its 2035 goals are technological leadership, avoiding dependence on quantum applications from outside the EU, and resilience against security threats. The strategy builds on the 614.9 million euros already granted to Quantum Delta NL and comes with no new budget: actions must fit existing departmental means, and ambitions will be adjusted if the money is not found.
The post-quantum timetable for central government
The security chapter sets a post-quantum cryptography schedule for every central government organization. By the end of 2026, quantum risk sits in risk management and each organization has its own cryptography policy. By the end of 2027, draft migration plans, pilots and budgets follow. By the end of 2028, procurement contracts can demand quantum-safe cryptography. High-risk uses must be migrated by the end of 2030 and medium-risk uses by the end of 2035. The strategy places a possible cryptographically relevant quantum computer between 2029 and 2035 and says the date is uncertain.
Two positions that set the Netherlands apart
Central government does not currently use quantum key distribution for information security, citing objections from several European security agencies. And a separate use case describes quantum decryption of criminal and terrorist communications as an opportunity for police, forensic institutes and intelligence services, which the strategy says should gain access to a quantum computer relatively quickly.