Shandong University's Chen and Li Recover 16 Private-Key-Dependent Bits From BIKE's BGF Decoder by Deep-Learning Power Analysis at 95.68 Percent, Cybersecurity 9:215, 16 September 2026
Defense Henry Quentir Defense Henry Quentir

Shandong University's Chen and Li Recover 16 Private-Key-Dependent Bits From BIKE's BGF Decoder by Deep-Learning Power Analysis at 95.68 Percent, Cybersecurity 9:215, 16 September 2026

On September 16, 2026, the journal Cybersecurity published a paper by Geng Chen, Yanbin Li and colleagues at Shandong University that reads a private-key-dependent 16-bit sequence out of the BIKE post-quantum decoder from a single power trace on an ARM Cortex-M4 board, at 95.68 percent perfect recovery. We read the deep-learning side-channel attack as an offensive extraction method, weigh what it does and does not transfer to the ML-KEM and HQC code a force will field, and set out the missing key-recovery stage, the untested countermeasures and the single-board evidence that stand between this post-quantum implementation security result and anything a program office would plan against.

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